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The Calamitous Law of Notes
NEIL B. COHEN*
The law of negotiable instruments is hemmed in on one side by its own
antiquity and on the other by the emergence of electronic communications.
These factors generally place negotiable instruments law under a great deal
of pressure. While most of that pressure is directed at payments law and,
thus, focuses on the provisions of negotiable instruments law that govern
checks, the law of notes is quite problematic as well. This article analyzes
the calamity that is the current law of notes, focusing on eight problematic
aspects. As the article demonstrates, that body of law is weighty, but of
ever-decreasing relevance; moreover, when relevant, it 'governs in
questionable ways.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current law of payment systems is a mess. That is hardly a novel or
controversial statement. Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), even as modernized by the 1990 and 2002 revisions, still reflect a
museum of the payment mechanisms of the late eighteenth century more than
they reflect today's economy. While an attempt was made in the 1980s to
rectify this situation with the New Payments Code, the problem is deeper and
older than that. By the 1940s and 1950s, it should have been seen that the
odd collection of doctrines contained in Articles 3 and 4 (effectuating the
assignability of an independent covenant to pay money, protection of the
property rights of certain good faith purchasers, force-fed adaptation of the
ancient law of drafts to modern payments by check, etc.) had either outlived
their usefulness or were only subtopics of a larger theme. Whereas Grant
Gilmore took a similar situation and used it to reformulate the law of secured
transactions, the drafters of Articles 3 and 4 merely gussied up the
antiquities. The result is much like the panda's thumb, a reasonably
functional mechanism made up of spare parts designed for other purposes.
We could have done better a half-century ago, and we need to do better now.
Much attention has been paid in the last few decades to Articles 3 and 4
of the UCC as part of current developments in the emerging law of payment
systems including checks, but comparatively little attention has been given to
UCC Article 3 insofar as it establishes the law of notes. In many ways, the
law of notes' as embodied in UCC Article 3 is scarcely different than the
* Jeffrey D. Forchelli Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. S.B., Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; J.D., New York University. This article was supported by a
Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Grant.
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doctrines developed by Lord Mansfield and his fellow travelers in the late
18th century.2 The worlds of finance and commerce have changed
dramatically in the intervening centuries, but the law of notes has been
largely constant. This phenomenon-changing commercial practices
governed by unchanging law-is the recipe for a commercial calamity. There
are at least eight aspects of the law of notes, as applied to our current credit
economy, that are problematic. This article briefly surveys these difficulties.
II. A LOT OF LAW, BUT NOT MANY NOTES
Article 3 of the UCC consists of 68 sections, all but seven of which apply
to notes.3 The Article contains a total of 76,071 words (including the Official
Comments). 4 This is a hefty piece of law. By way of comparison, the
Declaration of Independence contains 1325 words; the Constitution
(4ncluding amendments) contains 7591 words; the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights contains 1778 words; and the Emancipation Proclamation
contains 725 words. 5 Even in the context of the UCC, Article 3 is no
lightweight. It is longer, for example, than Article 2, which contains only
72,317 words,6 Article 5, which contains only 22,375 words, and Article 8,
which contains only 70,195 words. Yet each of those Articles contains much
more of commercial significance than Article 3. Article 3 is exceeded in
length only by the 900 pound gorilla of the UCC-Article 9-which contains
181,886 words.
history, does not necessarily match modem commercial realities. The focus of this article
is the law that governs notes. While the governing statute, as it stands, applies many of
the same rules to drafts as it does to notes, the critiques in this article are directed to those
rules only as they apply to notes. To make that point clear, this article frequently refers to
the "law of notes" even though many of its principles apply identically to checks and
other drafts.
2 As suggested by Ed Rubin and others, Lord Mansfield's role may have been more
of a clarifier and communicator than an originator of these doctrines. See Edward L.
Rubin, Learning from Lord Mansfield.- Toward a Transferability Law for Modern
Commercial Practice, 31 IDAHO L. REv. 775, 778-80 (1995).
3 The sections that do not apply to notes are: U.C.C. §§ 3-312 (Lost, Destroyed, or
Stolen Cashier's Check, Teller's Check, or Certified Check); 3-408 (Drawee Not Liable
on Unaccepted Draft); 3-409 (Acceptance of Draft; Certified Check); 3-410 (Acceptance
Varying Draft); 3-411 (Refusal to Pay Cashier's Checks, Teller's Checks, and Certified
Checks); 3-413 (Obligation of Acceptor); and 3-414 (Obligation of Drawer).
4 This word count is based on the 1990 Official Text. The number of words is
slightly higher in the 2002 Official Text.
5 By way of further comparison, the Gettysburg Address (albeit not a legal
document) contains only 278 words.
6 All word tallies for Articles of the UCC include the Official Comments.
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One would think that as lengthy a statute as Article 3 would govern
numerous transactions constituting an important segment of the economy.
Yet, as Ronald Mann and others have shown us, that belief would be
incorrect. Rather, a search for notes governed in any meaningful way by
Article 3 is a search for a very few needles in a very large number of
haystacks.
As noted by Ronald Mann, 7 who examined the major commercial
contexts in which it is frequently assumed that notes governed by Article 3
predominate, very few documents thought of as notes actually constitute
notes that are governed by Article 3. This is because they do not satisfy the
technical criteria for negotiability contained in UCC Section 3-104 and
related sections.
For example, Mann pointed out that most home mortgage "notes" are not
negotiable instruments under the criteria of UCC Section 3-104 and, thus, are
not "notes." As Mann noted, mortgage notes that follow the standard
FNMA/FHLMC multi-state form contain a non-monetary undertaking that
disqualifies them from negotiable status under UCC Section 3-104(a)(3). 8
Notes representing private commercial obligations similarly did not
qualify as negotiable instruments-Mann examined a number of form
promissory notes utilized by commercial lending institutions and concluded
that "none of these promissory notes were [sic] unquestionably negotiable. ' 9
He reached similar conclusions with respect to publicly traded commercial
obligations as well.' 0
It is possible that many promissory notes for consumer purchases of
goods or services fulfill the criteria of negotiability, but this conclusion must
be accompanied by a very large caveat. Most such promissory notes will
qualify as either a "consumer credit contract"'11 or "purchase money loan"'12
under the Federal Trade Commission's Holder in Due Course Regulations 13
and, therefore, must contain legend mandated by those rules. The legend
mandated for consumer credit contracts states:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
7 See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems,
44 UCLA L. REv. 951, 962-85 (1997).
8 Id. at 970.
9 Id. at 976.
10 See id. at 978.
11 See 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(i) (2006).
12 See id. § 433.1(d).
13 Id. § 433.
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OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS.
HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER. 
14
The legend mandated for purchase money loans is identical except for
the deletion of the words "pursuant hereto or.' 15
Under Article 3 as it was in effect at the time of promulgation of the FTC
regulations, either legend would have deprived a promissory note containing
it of negotiability inasmuch as it would have had the effect of transforming
the maker's obligation to pay money into a conditional obligation
(conditional on lack of defenses) rather than an unconditional obligation.16
The 1990 revisions to Article 3 restored negotiability to promissory notes
containing the FTC legend, but did so with an important twist. UCC Section
3-106(d) provides:
If a promise or order at the time it is issued or first comes into
possession of a holder contains a statement, required by applicable statutory
or administrative law, to the effect that the rights of a holder or transferee
are subject to claims or defenses that the issuer could assert against the
original payee, the promise or order is not thereby made conditional for the
purposes of Section 3-104(a); but if the promise or order is an instrument,
there cannot be a holder in due course of the instrument. 17
Thus, while the presence of the FTC legend does not keep a consumer
promissory note from qualifying as a note governed by UCC Article 3, that
governance is bowdlerized by the fact that the most important aspect of
negotiability-the rules flowing from holder in due course status--do not
apply to these notes.
In light of the fact that so few documents that we think of as notes are
actually governed by Article 3, it would appear that the Article, insofar as it
applies to notes, erects a massive infrastructure for which there are very few
users. It would be hard to conclude that the costs of that infrastructure are
justified by its minimal benefits. Rather, Article 3, at least as applied to
notes, may be the commercial law equivalent of the Alaskan "Bridge to
Nowhere."'1 8 Of course, unlike the Bridge to Nowhere, we already have the
14 Id. § 433.2.
15 Id.
16 See U.C.C. § 3-104(l)(b) (1989).
17 U.C.C. § 3-106(d) (2003).
18 The proposed $315 million Gravina Island Bridge would connect Ketchikan,
Alaska (population 8000) to Gravina Island (population 50), at a cost of $223 million, or
approximately $27,700 per person in the region or $4.5 million for each of the 50 current
residents of the island. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GravinaIslandBridge (last
visited October 6, 2006).
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Article 3 infrastructure. Yet even the costs of upkeep may not be justified by
the minimal usefulness of this infrastructure.
III. THE SUPERFLUOUSNESS OF MOST RULES IN THE LAW OF NOTES
Perhaps the statements made in Part I of this article about the paucity of
notes governed by UCC Article 3 are exaggerated, and there is no shortage of
notes to which Article 3 of the UCC may be applied. If that is the case, there
are still many reasons to be dissatisfied with the law of notes as set forth in
Article 3. One reason is quite basic-the law of notes, set out in such detail
in the sixty-eight sections of Article 3, is largely superfluous.
How can this be? Let us consider the functions fulfilled by the rules in
UCC Article 3. For the most part, the law of notes as embodied in UCC
Article 3 generally consists of three types of rules. First, several rules set out
the obligations of various parties to negotiable instruments. In the case of
notes, the relevant parties are makers 19 and indorsers, 20 as well as
accommodation parties.21 Second, another group of provisions provides rules
about transfer of negotiable instruments and the consequences of transfer.
These include not only the basic transfer rules in Section 3-203, but also
rules concerning warranties and the like. 22 The third set of rules is at the
heart of negotiable instruments law-these are the rules governing holder in
due course status and its consequences. The holder in due course rules can
themselves be divided into three categories. The first category of holder in
due course rules determines who qualifies as a holder in due course. These
preconditions for achieving the status of a holder in due course are discussed
in Part VIII below. The second category of holder in due course rules
provides the freedom from personal defenses of those who qualify as holders
in due course. 23 The third category of holder in due course rules provides
good title to negotiable instruments to those who qualify as holders in due
course of the instruments.24
All of the rules mentioned in the previous paragraph are important rules.
Let us go further and assume, at least for the time being, that they are good
rules. Nonetheless, for the most part, they are unnecessary rules.
They are unnecessary because, with the exception of the good title rules
for holders in due course, they could all be created by contract whether or not
19 See U.C.C. §§ 3-103(a)(7), 3-412 (2003). (The latter section applies because a
maker of a note also qualifies as an "issuer." See U.C.C. § 3-105(c) (2003)).
20 See id. §§ 3-204(b), 3-415.
21 See id. § 3-419.
22 See id. §§ 3-416, 3-417.
23 See id. § 3-305(b).
24 See id. § 3-306.
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the document evidencing the undertaking to pay qualifies as a note governed
by Article 3 of the UCC. Thus, while the rules may be beneficial, they do not
bring about results that could not be brought about, almost as simply, merely
by careful drafting of the underlying contract.
Certainly, the obligation of the maker of a note-to pay the amount of
the obligation in accordance with its terms to the person to whom the
obligation is then owed2 5-is quintessentially a contractual obligation, no
different than an obligation that can be created by express language in the
contractual document. While express language, of course, adds words to an
agreement, today's typical promissory note is hardly a terse affair in any
event, so it can hardly be said that a default rule that results in the maker's
obligation being an implicit term of a payment undertaking that qualifies as a
note represents a major advantage over the necessity of stating the obligation
expressly in an undertaking that does not qualify as a note.
Similarly, the obligation of an indorser can be stated explicitly in the
body of an undertaking to pay money. Once again, this would require
additional words, but these would be words of a boilerplate variety that
would not significantly lengthen the document. As with the maker's
obligation, the fact that the indorser's obligation is an implicit default rule in
the case of a note would not seem to provide a serious advantage to using
negotiable notes rather than other forms of payment undertaking inasmuch as
it is easy to express that obligation with explicit language.
It would seem that the second set of default rules for notes-those that
govern transfer of the undertaking-could also be replicated by contractual
language in the absence of statutorily implied rules. A provision in the
agreement creating the undertaking to pay money could state expressly the
effect of transfer of the obligee's rights on the obligations of the obligors
(such as makers and indorsers) of the undertaking, and the transferee of the
undertaking can certainly insist that the transferor provide warranties such as
those that are part of the Article 3 rules structure for notes. Thus, it would
appear that the transfer rules of UCC Article 3 do not provide any significant
benefits for notes that are not available for contractual obligations generally.
It is commonplace that the holder in due course doctrine is the heart of
the law governing negotiable instruments and, thus, notes. Accordingly, it
would seem that the holder in due course rules for notes would differ from
the other Article 3 rules discussed above in that they could not be created by
contract if Article 3 did not mandate them. Yet, even this statement is not
completely true. Rather, one of the two major functions of the holder in due
course doctrine can be achieved by contract independently of the statutory
language. I refer, of course, to the freedom from personal defenses that is
accorded to holders in due course by UCC Section 3-305(b). Such freedom
25 U.C.C. § 3-412 (2003).
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from defenses for assignees is frequently provided for in undertakings to pay
money that are not negotiable instruments. Indeed, such clauses are blessed
by the UCC for undertakings other than instruments. UCC Section 9-403(b)
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, an agreement between an
account debtor and an assignor not to assert against an assignee any claim
or defense that the account debtor may have against the assignor is
enforceable by an assignee that takes an assignment:
(1) for value;
(2) in good faith;
(3) without notice of a claim of a property or possessory right to the
property assigned; and
(4) without notice of a defense or claim in recoupment of the type that
may be asserted against a person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument
under Section 3-305(a). 26
To make sure that these contractual freedom-from-defense clauses do not
have greater reach than the freedom accorded to holders in due course in
Article 3, UCC Section 9-403(c) goes on to provide: "[s]ubsection (b) does
not apply to defenses of a type that may be asserted against a holder in due
course of a negotiable instrument under Section 3-305(b). ' 27
The common law can be interpreted to reach the same result as well.
Illustration 10 to Restatement (Second) Contracts § 336 provides:
A sells and delivers goods to B, and B agrees that in the event of an
assignment to C, B will pay the price to C without asserting any defense or
claim based on breach of warranty by A. A assigns his rights under the
contract to C, who takes in good faith and without notice of any defense or
claim. In the absence of statute or administrative rule, B is barred from
asserting against C a defense or claim based on breach of warranty by A.28
The result of the Article 9 provision and the Restatement rule is to allow
the creation, by contract, in an undertaking that does not qualify as a note, the
most famous attribute of negotiability. Once again, the law of notes has
added nothing to the parties' rights and duties other than brevity and
simplicity of drafting.
The other attribute of holder in due course status with respect to notes-
the good title afforded holders in due course29-would appear to be an
26 Id. §9-403(b).
27 Id. § 9-403(c).
28 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAC'S § 336 cmt. f, illus. 10 (1979).
29 UCC § 3-306 provides, in relevant part:
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attribute that cannot be created by contract. This is because, unlike the
freedom-from-personal-defenses feature of holder in due course status, the
good title rule does not affect only parties to the payment undertaking (such
as makers and indorsers) but, rather, affects all potential claimants to the
undertaking; by their nature, such claimants are not typically parties to the
undertaking. Competing claimants for a payment right who are not parties to
it cannot be said to have. had their property rights cut off by contracts to
which they were not parties.
What is the bottom line here? Only one attribute of notes-the ability of
holders in due course to get good title to them-cannot be created by simple
contract in undertakings that do not qualify as notes. While the Article 3
provisions that confer these attributes have some efficiency advantages in
that they need not be the subject of separate bargaining, those advantages
would appear to be slight in an era in which contracts creating payment
undertakings are often exceedingly detailed in any event. Thus, in the context
of notes, the Article 3 rules matrix would appear to add very little value
beyond what could be achieved by contract, other than the good title afforded
to a holder in due course.
IV. THE LACK OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TECHNICAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR NEGOTIABILITY OF NOTES AND THE
TRANSACTIONAL RULES OF ARTICLE 3
Perhaps I have been uncharitable toward UCC Article 3. While, even
without the benefit of the statute, most of the benefits of Article 3 can be
achieved by contract for a payment undertaking, it is certainly possible that
the efficiency advantages of having those rules being automatically included
as default rules rather than having to draft language effectuating those
benefits and obtain agreement to them by the parties (and accepted by
potential transferees) are more substantial than I think they are.
If that is the case, however, one can legitimately ask whether there is any
sensible relationship between those rules and the form requirements in
Article 3 for negotiability. After all, a payment undertaking that does not
fulfill those form requirements is not governed by UCC Article 3 and, thus,
A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a holder in
due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the instrument
or its proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the
instrument or its proceeds. A person having rights of a holder in due course takes
free of the claim to the instrument.
U.C.C. § 3-306 (2003) (emphasis added). For simplicity, this article frequently
abbreviates this right accorded to a holder in due course by section 3-306 as the "good
title" right.
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does not get the benefit of those rules.30 Why don't the transactional rules
governing notes apply to payment undertakings that do not fulfill the
technical requirements of negotiability? Is there something about a non-
negotiable undertaking that states "pay to Jane Doe" that justifies a different
legal effect for an indorsement on the undertaking than on an otherwise
identical undertaking that is negotiable because it instead states "pay to the
order of Jane Doe"? Is there something about a non-negotiable undertaking
with a due date triggered by an external event (say, the issuance of a
certificate of occupancy for a building) that justifies the lack of transfer
warranties that would be present if the undertaking were otherwise identical
except that it is negotiable because the due date qualifies as a "definite time"
under UCC Section 3-104?
I suggest that the technical requirements of negotiability bear no
discernible relation to the transactional rules in UCC Article 3. Rather, they
are just a hurdle to be satisfied in order for the transactional rules of the
Article to be default rules rather than rules that must be bargained for. (Or, to
phrase this in reverse, if the hurdles are satisfied, the parties have the burden
of agreeing upon and drafting any deviation from those default rules.31)
By way of contrast, consider the most important transactional default
rules of all-those that make it possible for a holder of a note to transfer it
without consent of the maker and any other obligor.32 If Article 3 does not
apply to a payment undertaking because the undertaking does not qualify as a
negotiable instrument, though, those rules do not apply. Does this mean that
there is a commercial policy in favor of easy transferability of undertakings
that qualify as notes but against easy transferability of undertakings that do
not qualify as notes? Of course not. Rather, both common law and statute
30 It should be noted that the 1962 text of Article 3 was not so strict in this regard.
Former UCC § 3-805 provided: "This Article applies to any instrument whose terms do
not preclude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this Article but which is
not payable to order or to bearer, except that there can be no holder in due course of such
an instrument." U.C.C. § 3-805 (1962). Thus, if the only reason that a payment
undertaking did not qualify as a negotiable instrument was the lack of "magic words"
(i.e., bearer or order), the transactional rules of Article 3-other than the holder in due
course rules-still applied. This is still the rule in New York and South Carolina, which
have not enacted the 1990 revised text of Article 3 or its 2002 amendments.
31 See, e.g., the rules requiring presentment and notice of dishonor in Part 5 of
Article 3. As provided in UCC §§ 3-504(a)(iii) and 3-504(b)(i), the terms of the note may
dispense with those requirements. U.C.C. §§ 3-504(a)(iii), 3-504(b)(i) (2003).
32 The obligations of an issuer and an indorser are owed to a person entitled to
enforce the instrument. See U.C.C. §§ 3-412, 3-415(a) (2003). By virtue of Sections 3-
203(b) and 3-301, a transferee is automatically a person entitled to enforce the
instrument, even if he or she does not qualify as a holder (assuming, of course, that the
transferor had the purpose of giving the transferee the right to enforce the instrument; see
U.C.C. § 3-203(a) (2003)).
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have developed transferability rules that parallel those in UCC Article 3.
Under the common law of contracts, a monetary claim already earned by
performance (as in the case of payment undertakings for which there is no
defense) can be assigned in the absence of a contractual restriction to the
contrary. 33 Moreover, even a contract term prohibiting assignment of rights
under a contract does not prohibit such an assignment of an earned right to
payment unless the contrary intention is manifested. 34 In addition, UCC
Sections 9-406 and 9-408 sweep away many contractual and legal
restrictions on the assignability of payment obligations. 35 To be sure, in the
case of payment intangibles and promissory notes, UCC Section 9-408 gives
some effect to restrictions on transfer contained in a payment undertaking,
but the Article 9 rules governing a negotiable note (which, by virtue of the
requirements of UCC Section 3-104 cannot contain a restriction on transfer)
and a non-negotiable "promissory note" that is silent as to transfer are
exactly the same. Thus, UCC Section 9-408 does not change the default rule
so much as it enables the parties to bargain for a different answer.
Article 3 of the UCC erects a series of form technicalities that serve as
the gatekeepers to the applicability of its transactional rules. Yet, the
technicalities seem to bear little or no relation to those rules or their
desirability. Rather, as is the case for much of the law governing notes, the
technicalities seem to be remnants of a bygone era rather than purposive
choices related to their effects.
V. ARTICLE 3's CODIFICATION OF COMMON LAW DOCTRINES LACKS
THE RICHNESS AND FLEXIBILITY OF THE COMMON LAW
While much of the law of notes involves the application of special rules
to payment undertakings that meet the technical requirements of negotiability
(even though, as I have suggested in Part IV above, in many cases there is no
discernible relation between those technical requirements and any
justification for the special rule), this is not always the case. Indeed, in a
small but significant portion of the law of notes, the opposite phenomenon is
present.
In these cases, negotiable instrument law, as enacted in Article 3 of the
UCC, is nothing more than a codification of the common law. As a
codification, though, the Article 3 versions of the common law doctrines at
33 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2) (1979).
34 See id. § 322(2).
35 UCC Article 9 not only applies to transactions in which personal property secures
an obligation but also to most sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and
promissory notes. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(3) (2003).
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issue may lack the flexibility of the common law to deal with new or
unforeseen circumstances.
A small example is provided by the law of consideration. The common
law has, over the years, developed a substantial body of law devoted to the
issue of consideration and the ability of an obligor to avoid liability on the
basis of lack of consideration or failure of consideration. 36 Article 3 reduces
this body of work to a paragraph. UCC Section 3-303(b) provides:
"Consideration" means any consideration sufficient to support a simple
contract. The drawer or maker of an instrument has a defense if the
instrument is issued without consideration. If an instrument is issued for a
promise of performance, the issuer has a defense to the extent performance
of the promise is due and the promise has not been performed. If an
instrument is issued for value as stated in subsection (a), the instrument is
also issued for consideration. 37
From this paragraph we learn (i) Article 3's definition of consideration,
(ii) that lack of consideration is a defense, and (iii) failure of consideration is
a defense. 38 Does Article 3 intend that this paragraph contains all of the
wisdom about consideration that is applicable to notes, or that the nuances of
the common law doctrines apply as well? The text of Article 3 provides no
clues. One could argue that UCC Section 1-103 leads to the conclusion that
common law concepts of consideration are available to supplement the rules
in UCC Section 3-303(b).39 If that is the case, though, why bother to put
consideration in Article 3 at all? Why not just leave it entirely to the common
law as incorporated through UCC Section 1-103?
A larger example is provided by the suretyship principles that are
codified in UCC Article 3. The journey taken by these sections from the
originally-enacted version of Article 3 through the 1990 revised Article 3 and
the 2002 amendments is interesting and instructive.
In the 1962 text of UCC Article 3, suretyship rules were codified in UCC
Sections 3-415(5) and 3-606. The former contained the rules establishing the
rights of the surety (known in Article 3 as an "accommodation party")
against the principal obligor (known in Article 3 as the "accommodated
36 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch. 4 (1979).
37 U.C.C. § 3-303(b) (2003).
38 Of course, these defenses are not available against a holder in due course. See
U.C.C. § 3-305 (2003).
39 UCC § 1-103(b) provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the
UCC], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative
to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress,
coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause supplement its
provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (2003).
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party"); the latter indicated the special defenses of the surety to its obligation
on the instrument.
Former UCC Section 3-415(5) provided that "[a]n accommodation party
is not liable to the party accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a
right of recourse on the instrument against such party. '40
Former UCC Section 3-606 provided:
(1) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that
without such party's' consent the holder
(a) without express reservation of rights releases or agrees not to sue
any person against whom the party has to the knowledge of the holder a
right of recourse or agrees to suspend the right to enforce against such
person the instrument or collateral or otherwise discharges such person,
except that failure or delay in effecting any required presentment, protest or
notice of dishonor with respect to any such person does not discharge any
party as to whom presentment, protest or notice of dishonor is effective or
unnecessary; or
(b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument given by or
on behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a right of
recourse.
(2) By express reservation of rights against a party with a right of
recourse the holder preserves
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when the instrument
was originally due; and
(b) the right of the party to pay the instrument as of that time; and
(c) all rights of such party to recourse against others.41
The right of recourse provided in former UCC Section 3-415(5) was
generally consistent with the surety's common law right of subrogation as it
existed at that time,42 but omitted any mention of the surety's rights of
reimbursement 43 and exoneration." The suretyship defenses provided in
former UCC Section 3-606 were essentially consistent with traditional
40 u.c.c. § 3-415(5) (1962).
41 U.C.C. § 3-606 (1962).
42 See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 141 (1941). References to the Restatement of
Security in this and subsequent footnotes are intended to reflect the state of the law of
suretyship and guaranty as it existed when Article 3 was initially drafted. The
Restatement of Security has since been superseded by Restatement (Third) Suretyship and
Guaranty (1996). See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
4 3 See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 104 (1941).
44 See id. § 112.
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common law notions of suretyship and guaranty but, by their relatively terse
nature, were not as nuanced as the common law doctrines. 45
As is the case with the consideration rules described above, the choice of
which aspects of the common law rules of suretyship and guaranty to state in
the text of former Article 3 and which to leave to the uncertainties of possible
incorporation through UCC Section 1-103 seems a bit arbitrary. For example,
since the common law right of subrogation did not typically arise unless and
until the surety fulfills the entire obligation of the principal obligor46 while
the right of reimbursement arose even for partial payments, 47 most sureties
would consider the absence of an explicitly stated right of reimbursement to
be troubling.
Against this background of incomplete statements of common law
principles, as well as some modernization of the common law, the 1990 text
of UCC Article 3 made substantial changes in the principles of suretyship
law as applied to notes. As I have noted elsewhere,48 these changes,
incorporated in revised UCC Sections 3-419 and 3-605, represented both a
modernization of suretyship rules and a partial misunderstanding of their
operation in typical commercial contexts. Partially as a result of analyses of
that sort, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) for the UCC promulgated a
PEB Commentary which took some of the rough edges off sections 3-419
and 3-605. 49
After the promulgation of the PEB Commentary, the American Law
Institute published the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship and Guaranty.50
This Restatement was influenced in part by the innovations in the 1990 text
of UCC Article 3, but avoided some of the pitfalls in that text. When the
Drafting Committee for the 2002 revisions to UCC Article 3 was constituted,
this Restatement was viewed with approval, and a decision was made that the
suretyship rules in Article 3 should be completely consistent with the rules in
the new Restatement. The result of that decision was the 2002 text of UCC
Sections 3-419 and 3-605. UCC Section 3-419 now includes not only
subrogation, but also reimbursement (added in the 1990 text) and
exoneration. Thus, it provides a terse summary of the rights of a secondary
obligor to be made or kept whole. UCC Section 3-605, as it appears in its
2002 manifestation, is quite massive. While it is a very well-drafted
45 See, e.g., id. §§ 122, 127-29, 132.
46 See id. § 141.
47 See id. § 104.
48 See Neil B. Cohen, Suretyship Principles in the New Article 3: Clarifications and
Substantive Changes, 42 ALA. L. REv. 595, 598-600 (1991).
49 See Permanent Editorial Bd. for the UCC, PEB Commentary No. 11 (1994, rev.
2002). The author of this Article was one of the drafters of that PEB Commentary.
50 The author of this Article was the Reporter for that Restatement.
2007]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
incorporation of the key rules from the Restatement, this effort took 1195
words of text and 5349 words in the Official Comment for its
accomplishment, making it the longest substantive section in the entire UCC.
Nonetheless, by its nature that section can incorporate only a fraction of the
detail appearing in the Restatement, which is a volume of several hundred
pages. At least this version of Article 3 does not leave us in doubt as to
whether its suretyship rules are intended to be a complete and exclusive
statement of the principles applicable to notes. Official Comment 1 to revised
UCC Section 3-605 provides:
This section contains rules that are applicable when a secondary obligor
(as defined in Section 3-103(a)(17)) is a party to an instrument. These rules
essentially parallel modem interpretations of the law of suretyship and
guaranty that apply when a secondary obligor is not a party to an
instrument. See generally Restatement of the Law, Third, Suretyship and
Guaranty (1996). Of course, the rules in this section do not resolve all
possible issues concerning the rights and duties of the parties. In the event
that a situation is presented that is not resolved by this section (or the other
related sections of this Article), the resolution may be provided by the
general law of suretyship because, pursuant to Section 1-103, that law is
applicable unless displaced by provisions of this Act. 5 1
While the 2002 revisions to the suretyship provisions in UCC Article 3
are both successful and represent an improvement over their predecessors,
one still must consider the advisability of producing an incomplete
paraphrase of a complex body of law, risking judicial inflexibility when a
matter apparently falls within the purview of the statutory text, rather than
simply referring the entire matter to the common law (with which total
consistency is the goal) via Section 1-103.
VI. THE LIMITED USEFULNESS OF THE FREEDOM FROM DEFENSES
ACCORDED TO A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
While most of the provisions of UCC Article 3 work together with the
goal of creating the structure of a smoothly flowing system, the conventional
wisdom is that the law of notes revolves around just a few sections in Article
3-those that contain the rules relating to holders in due course.52 For the
most, this core of Article 3 is contained in just three sections-UCC Sections
3-302, 3-305, and 3-306.
51 U.C.C. § 3-605 off. cmt. 1 (2003) (emphasis added).
52 See the interesting discussion of this point in James Steven Rogers, The Myth of
Negotiability, 31 B.C. L. REv. 265, 266-67 (1990).
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The first of those sections contains criteria for holder in due course
status.53 The other two sections provide the benefits of holder in due course
status. While the benefit of holder in due course status afforded by UCC
Section 3-306 (good title to the instrument) may have greater commercial
utility than is generally appreciated, it is the benefit afforded by UCC Section
3-305-freedom from personal defenses 54 -that gets all the attention.
Yet, the freedom from personal defenses that is the hallmark of holder in
due course status is of remarkably limited utility in today's economy. First,
as noted above, there are simply not many notes to which the holder in due
course doctrine even applies. 55 The number of payment undertakings that
qualify as negotiable instruments is surprisingly low and, while consumer
notes that contain the FTC holder in due course language are negotiable
instruments, those instruments cannot have holders in due course.56
Even in situations to which the holder in due course doctrine applies,
however, the effect of the freedom from defenses strand of that doctrine may
be less than is generally appreciated. Why? Because, in all likelihood, there
are not many defenses from which to be free.
For example, consider consumer obligations not covered by the FTC
holder in due course regulations.57 These are primarily payment undertakings
issued in exchange for home mortgage loans or car loans from lenders
unrelated to the seller of the car. In each case, the payee almost certainly
advanced the funds that are covered by the payment undertaking. As a result,
even if enforcement of the note were sought by someone who did not qualify
as a holder in due course, the maker would have no defenses. After all, the
payment undertaking was entered into to repay the funds advanced and the
funds were advanced. There would be no defense that could be raised with
respect to the advance, and any claims that the maker might have against the
person from whom it bought the house or car would not be defenses against
the lender in any event. As a result, the cut-off of personal defenses would
largely be irrelevant.58
For the most part, it would appear that there are similarly few defenses
available for most commercial payment undertakings. First, as demonstrated
53 See discussion infra Part VIII.
54 See U.C.C. § 3-305(b) (2003).
55 See supra text accompanying notes 7-16.
56 See U.C.C. § 3-106(d) (2003).
57 See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
58 Of course, there are some defenses that might be available to a maker even if the
undertaking was to repay a loan that was actually made. For example, the maker may
have paid the note or otherwise have been discharged from it before the note somehow
made its way to a holder in due course. Such scenarios, though, are more common in law
school exams than in actual transactions.
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by Mann, even in the case of notes as to which the holder in due course
doctrine is applicable, very few notes are transferred to transferees who
would qualify as holders in due course.59 Second, and perhaps more
important, it would seem that, as in the case with consumer undertakings,
most commercial notes are issued in exchange for loans made and, thus,
there are not likely to be defenses that would have been available to the
maker in any event. While there is certainly a large market for goods and
services sold on commercial credit, it is my impression that this credit is
extended on the basis of open accounts or chattel paper that does not include
a negotiable instrument much more often than on the basis of a negotiable
instrument (whether or not included in chattel paper).
If, as appears to be the case, there are very few notes as to which obligors
could successfully raise defenses, the importance of a doctrine that cuts off
those defenses in some circumstances would appear to be quite limited.
Indeed, a search for cases citing UCC Section 3-305 (the section in Article 3
that cuts off personal defenses as against a holder in due course) since
January 1, 2005 reveals no cases.
Of course, my impressions as to the lack of circumstances in which there
are defenses to notes may be incorrect and the lack of reported cases may fail
to give warning of a submerged iceberg. If that is the case, and a significant
number of defenses are cut off by holders in due course, the question is
raised as to whether this doctrine represents good social policy. A generation
ago, Albert Rosenthal argued that negotiability is a doctrine whose time has
passed.60 In addition, Jim Rogers has questioned the historical pedigree of
the doctrine as one that cuts off defenses.61 While the freedom from defenses
doctrine certainly can work to increase the marketability of notes, the cost to
any makers with otherwise effective defenses that are cut off by the rule is
quite large. At the very least, this counsels against a legal doctrine that brings
about such a dramatic result even in the absence of explicit agreement that
defenses would not be available against transferees. While UCC Section 9-
403 blesses contractual provisions that bring about a cut-off of defenses,
those provisions at least are explicit, and put the obligor on some notice that
it may have to pay an assignee even in circumstances in which a defense
could be raised against the initial obligee.
59 See Mann, supra note 7, at 998-1004.
60 See Albert J. Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 CoLuM. L. REv. 375,
401-02 (1971).
61 See Rogers, supra note 52, at 266-67.
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VII. THE QUESTIONABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE POLICIES
FAVORING GOOD TITLE FOR AN ASSIGNEE OF A NOTE AND THE
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF NEGOTIABILITY?
One aspect of the law of notes that appears to have significant
commercial importance is the freedom from competing property claims that
is enjoyed by a holder in due course of a note.62 Because this aspect of the
holder in due course doctrine can work to cut off the rights of third parties
who are not parties to the note (or to any other agreement with the holder in
due course), this result cannot be achieved by contract. 63
This good title strand contrasts with the freedom from defenses strand of
the holder in due course doctrine in two ways. First, as noted earlier, the
results of the latter strand can be created by contract even in the absence of a
statute that brings about the result automatically. Second, this good title
strand, unlike the freedom from defenses strand, appears to have significant
commercial utility. Securitization and structured finance transactions
involving notes require an entity that has unquestioned ownership of the
notes, and factors and similar high-volume buyers of notes are similarly
benefited by freedom from ownership claims, especially for notes that may
have passed through a series of transferees.
Given the utility of the good title strand of the holder in due course
doctrine, one might wonder why it is featured in my list of problematic
aspects of the law of notes. The reason lies not in the utility of the doctrine,
but in its operation. There are two aspects of the good title strand of the
holder in due course doctrine as applied to notes that are worthy of question.
First, it is hardly clear why, for a payment undertaking to be eligible for
the benefits of this good title doctrine, the technical requirements for
negotiability of the undertaking must be met. What is it, for example, about
an undertaking to pay a fluctuating sum, or an undertaking that contains a
promise other than the payment of money, that makes the undertaking
unworthy of eligibility for the good title doctrine?64 There does not seem to
be any discernible connection between the policies in favor of protecting a
good faith purchaser against property claims of others and fulfillment of
these criteria, and there does not seem to be any policy reason to deny
protection to such a purchaser simply because one of these criteria is not
fulfilled.
62 See U.C.C. § 3-306 (2003).
63 See supra text accompanying note 29.
64 An undertaking to pay a fluctuating sum cannot be a negotiable instrument
because it fails to fulfill the criterion that the undertaking be to pay a fixed amount of
money. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a) (2003) (The addition of another promise violates UCC § 3-
104(a)(3)).
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Second, it is not clear why the good title strand of the law of notes differs
from other good title doctrines in commercial law. Compare, for example,
the good title doctrine of notes with the analogous good title doctrine for
negotiable documents of title. Under the latter doctrine, a holder to whom a
negotiable document of title has been "duly negotiated" acquires title to the
document and the goods it represents. 65
A document is duly negotiated if it is negotiated.., to a holder that
purchases it in good faith, without notice of any defense against or claim to
it on the part of any person, and for value, unless it is established that the
negotiation is not in the regular course of business or financing or involves
receiving the document in settlement or payment of a monetary
obligation. 66
This good title doctrine differs from the good title strand of the holder in
due course doctrine for notes in several ways. For example, the rule for
documents of title is limited to situations in which the negotiation is in the
regular course of business or financing, a requirement that is not present for
the negotiation of notes. 67 Also, in order to qualify for the good title
protection, the transferee of a negotiable document of title may not receive
the document as payment of a monetary obligation. This is in
contradistinction to the parallel doctrine for notes, which defines "value" to
include a payment of an antecedent debt. Yet, it is hardly obvious why these
65 See U.C.C. § 7-502(a) (2003).
66 See id. § 7-501(a)(5).
67 As explained in the Official Comments to § 7-501:
There are two aspects to the usual and normal course of mercantile dealings,
namely, the person making the transfer and the nature of the transaction itself. The
first question which arises is: Is the transferor a person with whom it is reasonable to
deal as having full powers? In regard to documents of title the only holder whose
possession or control appears, commercially, to be in order is almost invariably a
person in the trade. No commercial purpose is served by allowing a tramp or a
professor to "duly negotiate" an order bill of lading for hides or cotton not their own,
and since such a transfer is obviously not in the regular course of business, it is
excluded from the scope of the protection ....
The second question posed by the "regular course" qualification is: Is the
transaztion one which is normally proper to pass full rights without inquiry, even
though the transferor itself may not have such rights to pass, and even though the
transferor may be acting in breach of duty? In raising this question the "regular
course" criterion has the further advantage of limiting, the effective wrongful
disposition to transactions whose protection will really further trade. Obviously, the
snapping up of goods for quick resale at a price suspiciously below the market
deserves no protection as a matter of policy: it is also clearly outside the range of
regular course.
U.C.C. § 7-501 off. cmt. 1 (2003).
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policies that prevent the cut-off of title claims for negotiable documents and
the goods they represent do not also apply to notes.
VIII. THE MINDLESS LINKAGE OF THE CRITERIA FOR A TRANSFEREE'S
FREEDOM FROM DEFENSES WITH THE CRITERIA FOR A TRANSFEREE'S
GOOD TITLE
A person who has the rights of a holder in due course is doubly blessed
by the law of notes. That person owns the note free of all competing claims
to it68 and, in enforcing the note, is not subject to personal defenses. 69 These
two advantages of holder in due course status are quite different-the first is
a property right and the second is a contract right.
Not surprisingly, the criteria for holder in due course status reflect the
policy justifications for both of those rights. For example, UCC Section 3-
302 provides that a holder in due course must (i) be a holder (ii) of an
instrument that does not look fishy 70 who (iii) took the instrument for value7'
and in good faith.72 Of the remaining criteria, most effectuate policies
relating to freedom from defenses, while one effectuates a policy related to
the freedom from competing claims.
UCC Section 3-302(a)(2)(vi) is the broadest of the remaining criteria. It
provides that, to qualify as a holder in due course, a holder must take the
instrument "without notice that any party has a defense or claim in
recoupment described in Section 3-305(a). '73 (Section 3-305(a) sets out the
"real" defenses of an obligor,74 the obligor's "personal" defenses, 75 and the
obligor's claims in recoupment that can be utilized to lessen or eliminate
liability on the instrument.76)
UCC Sections 3-302(a)(2)(iii) and 3-302(a)(2)(iv) go beyond requiring
that the holder be free from notice of defenses to require that, to qualify as a
holder in due course, the holder take the instrument without notice of certain
facts that might suggest that the maker or another obligor has a defense. UCC
68 See U.C.C. § 3-306 (2003).
69 See id. § 3-305(b).
70 More formally, UCC § 3-302(a)(1) requires that "the instrument when issued or
negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of forgery or alteration or
is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its authenticity."
U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(1) (2003).
71 Id. § 3-302(a)(2)(i).
72 Id. § 3-302(a)(2)(ii).
73 Id. § 3-302(a)(2)(vi).
74 Id. § 3-305(a)(1).
75 Id. § 3-305(a)(2).
76 U.C.C. § 3-305(a)(3) (2003).
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Section 3-302(a)(2)(iii) provides that, to qualify as a holder in due course; the.
holder must take the instrument "without notice that [it] is overdue or has
been dishonored or that there is an uncured default with respect to payment
of another instrument issued as part of the same series." This criterion clearly
relates to freedom from defenses, because a person who takes the instrument
in the circumstances described would have reason to believe that the issuer of
the instrument might be resisting payment because it believes that it has a.
defense.
Similarly, UCC Section 3-302(a)(2)(iv) provides that, to qualify as a
holder in due course, the holder must take the instrument "without notice that
[it] contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered."' 77 Again, this
criterion clearly relates to freedom from defenses, because.a holder that had
notice of the facts described would have notice that the apparent issuer would
have a defense if sued for the apparent amount of the instrument.
Finally, UCC Section 3-302(a)(2)(v) contains a criterion relating to
freedom from competing claims. That section provides that, to qualify as a
holder in due course, the holder must take the instrument "without notice of
any claim to the instrument. ' 78 It is clear that the policy here is not to award
good title over competing claimants to a transferee who took the instrument
with some idea that competing claims existed.
All of the criteria described in the preceding paragraphs would appear to
make a great deal of sense. What, then, is the problem?
The problem is that the two advantages of holder in due course status,
and the criteria justifying those two advantages, are yoked together. A holder
cannot qualify for either advantage unless it qualifies for both.
This makes very little sense. There appears to be no good reason that a
holder who takes a note for value, in good faith, and without notice of any
claims to the instrument should fail to get good title and, thus, be subject to
an unknown claim merely because the note was overdue when it was
acquired.79 There is nothing about the fact that a transferee has notice that a
note is overdue that affects ownership of the note or that should give a
potential acquirer of the note reason to believe that all is not right on the
ownership front. Why doesn't the law provide that the transferee gets good
title to the note (since it had no notice with respect to title issues) while still
being subject to any defenses (since it did have notice of facts that could
suggest the existence of defenses)? Similarly, there is nothing about the fact
that a transferee of a note has notice that there might be an adverse
ownership claim to it that gives the transferee notice of any possible defenses
77 Id. § 3-302(a)(2).
78 Id.
79 A holder who takes a note with notice that it is overdue cannot be a holder in due
course. See U.C.C. § 3-302(a)(2)(iii) (2003).
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on the part of an obligor. Why can't the transferee enforce the note free of
defenses, especially if the potential adverse claim turns out not to be valid?
After all, the transferee had notice of a potential claim of ownership of the
note, but it did not have notice that any obligor had defenses that could be
raised to the obligation to pay the note. Does the acquirer's decision to take
the risk associated with uncertain ownership necessarily mandate that it also
take the risk of unknown defenses?
A more sensible way of establishing conditions for a note transferee to
get good title to a note or to be free of defenses to it would be to separate the
criteria for freedom from adverse claims from the criteria for freedom from
defenses.80 This would avoid the unjustified situation of the failure to qualify
for one type of freedom also disqualifying the holder from the other type of
freedom.
IX. THE ANACHRONISTIC MERGER DOCTRINE
Another principle that is at the core of the law of notes is the so-called
"merger doctrine." That doctrine is primarily codified in UCC Section 3-310,
which provides that when a note is taken for an obligation, two consequences
follow. First, the obligation is suspended to the same extent that it would be
discharged if the amount of the note were paid in money. 81 Second, payment
of the note discharges the obligation to the extent of the payment. 82
Grant Gilmore memorably described the merger doctrine as follows:
In putting together their law of negotiable instruments, the courts
assumed that the new mercantile currency was a good thing whose use
should be encouraged. Two quite simple ideas became the foundation
pieces for the whole structure. One was the good faith purchase idea....
The other idea which, the first time you run into it, sounds like nonsense-
the legal mind at its worst-was even more basic to the structure and indeed
was what gave the completed edifice its pure and almost unearthly beauty.
That was the idea that the piece of paper on which the bill was written or
printed should be treated as if it-the piece of paper-was itself the claim
or debt which it evidenced. This idea came to be known as the doctrine of
merger-the debt was merged into the instrument. At one stroke it
drastically simplified the law of negotiable instruments, to the benefit of
both purchasers and the people required to pay the instruments. Under
merger theory the only way of transferring the debt represented by the bill
80 While today we tend to think of these two attributes of holder in due course status
as conjoined twins, their historical development was quite separate, with the good title
attribute developing well in advance of freedom from defenses. See Rosenthal, supra note
60, at 377-78.
81 See U.C.C. § 3-310(b) (2003).
82 See id. § 3-310(b)(2).
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was by physical delivery of the bill itself to the transferee .... Only the
holder-the person physically in possession of the bill under a proper chain
of endorsements-was entitled to demand payment of the bill from the
party required to pay it; only payment to such a holder discharged the bill as
well as the underlying obligation. 83
The merger doctrine may be a wonderful doctrine whose time has come
and gone. It presupposes a world in which debts are evidenced by pieces of
paper that move from hand to hand in commerce. This is anachronistic in two
ways. First, signed pieces of paper are highly inefficient in a world of
electronic commerce. Second, requiring the piece of paper to move along
with changes in its ownership (and ownership of the underlying claim) is
unrealistic in a world of participations, mortgage servicers, sales of fractional
interests in claims, and securitization and structured finance.
The first anachronism might possibly be addressed by allowing
something that qualifies as the electronic equivalent of a writing, and that
otherwise fulfilled the criteria for negotiable instrument status, to be
considered a negotiable instrument. Indeed, the UCC has already begun to
move in this direction in the related areas of electronic chattel paper and
electronic documents of title.84 Yet, the Drafting Committee that recently
revised UCC Articles 3 and 4 was conducting its deliberations after the 1998
revision of Article 9 that added electronic chattel paper and
contemporaneously with the Drafting Committee for revised Article 7 that
added the concept of electronic documents of title; nonetheless, it showed no
enthusiasm for a parallel approach that would create electronic negotiable
instruments.
The second anachronism is, in a sense, emblematic of the modem-day
law of notes. The law is designed for a day in which pieces of paper that
were not money passed in commerce as sort of a quasi-currency whose value
depended on the credit-worthiness of their issuers. That day is long gone, but
the law of notes has not noticed.
Perhaps it is time for a modified merger doctrine. Such a doctrine would
allow a contractual obligation to pay money to be embodied in a "clean"
legal instrument (i) that is somewhat independent of the facts that give rise to
it and (ii) satisfaction of which would also satisfy the underlying contractual
obligation. This would embrace the policies supporting the merger doctrine
while disentangling them from the world of possessible documents.
83 Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGHToN L. REV. 441, 448-50 (1979).
84 See U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(31), 1-201(a)(15) (2003).
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X. CONCLUSION
The problematic aspects of the law of notes that are surveyed in this
Article reflect a broader problem--the law consists of a collection of old
doctrines of questionable applicability and doubtful relevance. To the extent
that the law is simply inapplicable to most transactions (as explored in Part I
above), the problem may not seem to have serious adverse consequences
(except to law students who devote time to mastering the arcana of statute).
Yet, the existence of an extensive body of law that appears to apply to
matters to which it does not can lead to no good end. To the extent that
doctrines of questionable commercial sensibility are actually applied to
modem-day disputes, though, the cost is obviously much greater. In either
case, the sorry state of the law of notes is a commercial calamity in the
making. This is not to say that we do not need a body of law to govern
undertakings to pay money; we do need such a body of law, but the current
law of notes does not fit the bill.

